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STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Brandon Peaslee entered a conditional plea of guilty to conspiracy to commit robbery and 
the district court imposed a unified sentence of life, with ten years fixed. On appeal, Mr. Peaslee 
asserts that the district court erred in determining that he was not coerced and voluntarily waived 
his Miranda rights during an interrogation in which he made inculpatory statements; the district 
court erred in holding that he voluntarily consented to a search of his vehicle; and the district 
court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive, both fixed and aggregate, sentence upon 
him in light of the mitigating factors present in his case. 
Statement of the Facts and Course Proceedings 
In the early morning hours of May 14, 2011, nineteen year old Brandon Peaslee agreed to 
drive Taylor Wray to the Jackson's Chevron on Chinden Boulevard in Garden City. (PSI, pp.2-
7.) Mr. Wray wanted to rob the Jackson's to obtain money to pay an outstanding drug debt. 
(PSI, p.5.) Mr. Peaslee drove Mr. Wray to the gas station and waited outside as Mr. Wray 
entered with Mr. Peaslee's shotgun. (PSI, pp.2-7.)1 Mr. Wray entered the Jackson's with the 
loaded firearm, yelled for the clerk, Larry Hammen, to open the safe, despite Mr. Hammen's 
protests that he could not. (PSI, p.2.) Mr. Wray then fired three shots at Mr. Hammen and fled 
the store. (PSI, p.2.) Mr. Hammen was struck in the left arm and chest. (PSI, pp.2-3.) 
Mr. Peaslee, while sitting in the vehicle, heard three "plink" sounds, which he identified as being 
gun shots. (PSI, p.5.) When Mr. Peaslee questioned Mr. Wray about the gunshots, Mr. Wray 
1 While attempting to load the shotgun, Mr. Wray caused it to jam. Mr. Peaslee "field-stripped" 
the firearm, clearing the jam, and handed it back to Mr. Wray. (PSI, p.3.) 
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told him that he just shot to scare the clerk and did not harm him. (PSI, p.5.) After driving 
around and spending some time at the Wal-Mart on Overland, Mr. Peaslee drove Mr. Wray 
home. (PSI, pp.3, 5.) 
The following morning, Mr. Peaslee drove to Mountain Home to stay with his girlfriend 
and was ultimately interrogated by officers at the Mountain Home police station. (PSI, p.3.) 
Mr. Peaslee admitted to officers that he was driving the vehicle at the time of the incident. (PSI, 
p.3.) During a search of Mr. Peaslee's vehicle, officers located the items used in the Jackson's 
robbery. (PSI, p.3.) 
Mr. Peaslee was charged by Indictment with conspiracy to commit robbery and infliction 
of great bodily harm during an attempted felony or conspiracy. (R., pp.51-53.) Defense counsel 
for Mr. Peaslee filed a Motion to Suppress seeking to suppress all inculpatory statements made 
by Mr. Peaslee during the interrogation, as well as the evidence obtained during the search of 
Mr. Peaslee's vehicle. (R., pp.85-86, 91-116.) Following a suppression hearing, the district 
court entered an order denying Mr. Peaslee's Motion to Suppress. (R., pp.134-141.) The district 
court concluded that Mr. Peaslee voluntarily waived his Miranda2 rights, the waiver was valid, 
and he was not subjected to any improper coercion. (R., p.140.) With regard to the search, the 
district court stated, "I also find that this consent to search his vehicle was voluntarily given and 
valid." (R., p.141.) 
Mr. Peaslee then entered a conditional plea of guilty to conspiracy to commit robbery, 
preserving his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. (R., pp.144-153.) The 
district court imposed a unified sentence of life, with ten years fixed, upon Mr. Peaslee. (R., 
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 348 U.S. 436 (1985). 
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pp.163-165.) The district court also imposed an Order for Restitution and Judgment in the 
amount of $236,316.42. (R., pp.161-162.) Mr. Peaslee timely filed a Notice of Appeal from the 
district court's Judgment and Commitment. (R., pp.167-169.) Mr. Peaslee then filed an Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 motion, which was denied by the district court.3 (Augmentation) 
3 Because the district court did not deny Mr. Peaslee's Rule 35 motion until 253 days after it was 
filed and 361 days after the Judgment of Conviction was entered, it is likely the district court was 
without jurisdiction at the time the motion was denied. See State v. Tranmer, 135 Idaho 614 (Ct. 
App. 2001). As such, that issue is not raised on appeal. 
3 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err in denying Mr. Peaslee's motion to suppress statements and 
evidence in violation of his rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of life, with 
ten years fixed, upon Mr. Peaslee, following his plea of guilty to conspiracy to commit 
robbery, in light of the mitigating factors present in his case? 
4 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred In Failing To Grant Mr. Peaslee's Motion To Suppress As His 
Statements Were Coerced And Obtained In Violation Of His Right To Due Process Of Law 
A. Introduction 
Following an extended interrogation in a small room with law enforcement officers, 
Mr. Peaslee admitted to driving a vehicle that was used in the armed robbery and shooting of 
clerk at Jackson's Chevron. Mr. Peaslee also permitted officers to search his vehicle, wherein 
officers eventually located the shotgun used in the shooting. Mr. Peaslee contends that his 
statements were coerced and obtained in violation of his right to Due Process. 
B. Relevant Jurisprudence And Standard Of Review 
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that a defendant 
has a constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. U.S. CONST amend. V. A defendant's 
Fifth Amendment rights must be explained to him before custodial interrogation may begin. 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). According to Miranda: 
when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by 
the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege 
against self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be 
employed to protect the privilege, and unless other fully effective means are 
adopted to notify the person of his right of silence and to assure the exercise of the 
right will be scrupulously honored, the following measures are required. He must 
be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that 
anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to 
the presence of an attorney; and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be 
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. 
Id. at 464. 
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The United States Supreme Court "has long held that certain interrogation techniques, 
either in isolation or as applied to the unique characteristics of a particular suspect, are so 
offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985) (citing 
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)). Confessions that are secured through 
constitutionally invalid means are described as "involuntary." Id. ( citing Blackburn v. Alabama, 
361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960)). "The doctrine disallowing the use of involuntary confessions ... is 
grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and it applies to any 
confession that was the product of police coercion, either physical or psychological, or that was 
otherwise obtained by methods offensive to due process." State v. Doe, 130 Idaho 811, 814-815 
(citing Miller, supra; Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304 (1985); Haynes v. Washington, 373 
U.S. 503, 514-515 (1963)). "[C]oercion can be mental as well as physical, and that the blood of 
the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition." Blackburn 361 U.S. at 
206 (citing Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940)). The proper inquiry is to determine, from 
the totality of the circumstances, whether the incriminating statements were the product of the 
defendant's will being overborne by police coercion. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285-
288 (1991 ). The standard ofreview of a suppression motion is bifurcated. 
When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact which were supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the 
application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 
561 (Ct. App. 1996). The ultimate question of whether a confession was involuntary is a legal 
question subject to de novo review. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 287. 
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C. The District Court Erred In Failing To Grant Mr. Peaslee's Motion To Suppress As His 
Statements Were Coerced And Obtained In Violation Of His Right To Due Process Of 
Law 
Prior to trial, defense counsel for Mr. Peaslee filed a Motion to Suppress all inculpatory 
statements made by Mr. Peaslee during the interrogation, as well of the evidence obtained during 
the search of Mr. Peaslee's vehicle. (R., pp.85-86, 91-116.) Mr. Peaslee argued that he was "in 
custody" for purposes of Miranda because the interrogation took place "at the Elmore County 
Sheriff's Department ... in a small room behind closed doors where Brandon was alone, with 
two experienced, armed detectives." (R., p.101.) Additionally, "Brandon was never advised that 
he was free to leave[,] ... was aggressively interrogated for well over one (1) continuous hour[,] 
... [and] the interrogating detectives expressly manifested their belief of Brandon's culpability 
and the potentially severe consequences thereof." (R., p.101.) 
Next, defense counsel argued that Mr. Peaslee's "purported waiver of his Miranda rights 
was not voluntary, knowing, or intelligent because it was obtained by the use of a materially 
deceptive 'notification' form."4 (R., p.102.) Trial counsel argued that the "form mislead 
4 The "notification" form, which required Mr. Peaslee to initial after each statement, provided: 
( 1) I have the right to remain silent. 
(2) Anything I say may be used against me in a court oflaw. 
(3) I have the right to talk to a lawyer, and have my lawyer present with me while being 
questioned. 
(4) If I cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent me free of charge 
before any questioning. 
(5) I can decide at any time to exercise these rights, and not answer any questions or make 
any statements. 
(6) I understand these rights, and having them in mind, I wish to talk to the officer now. 
(Defendant's Exhibit B). 
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Brandon into believing he was signing and initialing a mere notification of his Miranda rights 
when in fact he was also waiving those rights at the same time. Not only is this form materially 
misleading, but it did not provide Brandon with the option to waiver or not waive said rights." 
(R., p.103 (emphasis in original).) In sum, Mr. Peaslee "was never given the option to waive or 
not to waive said rights." (R., p.103 (emphasis in original).) Finally, Mr. Peaslee argued that the 
physical evidence seized from his vehicle should also be suppressed because Mr. Peaslee's 
alleged consent to search was "irrevocably intertwined with and the result of illegal police 
activity." (R., p.104.) Effectively, it was Mr. Peaslee's contention that because the inculpatory 
statements he made during the interrogation were obtained without a valid waiver of his Miranda 
rights, his alleged consent and the subsequent search were "fruits" of the initial illegal police 
activity. 
In response, the State argued that Mr. Peaslee's written and verbal Miranda waiver was 
valid. (R., pp.124-125.) The State then argued that even if Mr. Peaslee's statement that he 
understood his rights and subsequent answering of all questions asked by the officers was not 
sufficient, "a defendant does not need to make a specific indication that he waives his rights, so 
long as he is properly informed." (R., p.126 (citing Berghuis v. Thompkins, __ U.S. __ , 130 
S.Ct. 2250 (2010).) 
The district court then held a hearing on the suppression motion. During the hearing, Mr. 
Peaslee testified that he had never previously been arrested, was never told he was free to leave 
the interrogation, initialed the notification form at the request of officers, and believed that once 
he initialed the boxes on the "notification" form, he was required to answer the officers' 
questions. (10/3/11 Tr., p.11, L.24- p.15, L.17.) Then, during cross-examination by the State, 
8 
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Mr. Peaslee acknowledged that: he knew had the right to remain silent; if he would have told 
officers he did not want to talk, the interrogation would have been over; if he would have asked 
for an attorney, one would have been appointed before any further questions were asked; he had 
a constitutional right to stop answering questions; and he did not say anything to the officers to 
convey that he did not wish to speak with them. (10/3/11 Tr., p.19, L.25 - p.31, L.10.) On 
redirect, Mr. Peaslee testified that he was trying to do what the detectives wanted him to so as to 
not make them upset. (10/6/11 Tr., p.37, L.6- p.38, L.7.) 
The district court then issued a written decision find that Mr. Peaslee voluntarily waived 
his Miranda rights, the waiver was valid, and he was not subjected to any improper coercion. 
(R., p.140.) With regard to the search, the district court stated, "I also find that this consent to 
search his vehicle was voluntarily given and valid." (R., p.141.) 
Mr. Peaslee asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the 
inculpatory statements made during the interrogation and the physical evidence obtained 
following a search of his vehicle. Mr. Peaslee is mindful of both Miranda and Berghuis v. 
Thompkins, __ U.S. __ , 130 S.Ct. 2250 (2010), but asserts, as articulated by defense counsel 
in his Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress and during the motion to suppress 
hearing, that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress. The arguments made by 
defense counsel in his Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress and during the 
suppression hearing are incorporated herein by reference. 
9 
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II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Life, With 
Ten Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Peaslee Following His Plea Of Guilty To Conspiracy To Commit 
Robbery, In Light Of The Mitigating Factors Present In His Case 
Mr. Peaslee asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of life, with ten 
years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an 
excessively harsh sentence the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record, 
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection 
of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an 
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing 
the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) ( quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 
573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Peaslee does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. 
Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Peaslee must show that in light of the 
governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. ( citing State 
v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 
Idaho 385 (1992)). The governing criteria, or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) 
protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility 
of rehabilitation; and ( 4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. ( quoting State v. Wolfe, 
99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978), (overruled on other grounds by State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138 
(2001)). 
10 
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Mr. Peaslee asserts that when reviewing the governing criteria in light of the facts and 
circumstances of this case, both the determinate and aggregate portions of his sentence are 
excessive. Mr. Peaslee requests that this Court reduce his sentence to fifteen years, with five 
years fixed, which is the more appropriate sentence considering all of the circumstances in his 
case. The first objective a court is to review is protection of society. Society would be 
adequately protected if Mr. Peaslee were paroled at an earlier date. Mr. Peaslee acknowledges 
that the underlying factual background of his criminal offense is extremely serious; a Chevron 
clerk was shot by his co-defendant Taylor Wray. (PSI, pp.2-3.) Not to discount the nature of 
the offense, Mr. Peaslee's role must be examined. Mr. Peaslee did not pull the trigger on the 
night of the offense; rather, Mr. Peaslee drove Mr. Wray to the location, not knowing that 
Mr. Wray would escalate the robbery by shooting the clerk. (PSI, pp.5-6.) While Mr. Peaslee 
admitted to fixing the jammed firearm, Mr. Wray reloaded the weapon prior to entering the 
Chevron. (PSI, p.5.) After hearing the shots and inquiring as to whether Mr. Wray shot the 
clerk, Mr. Wray informed Mr. Peaslee that he only shot to scare the clerk. (PSI, p.5.) 
So, how is it that a nineteen year old kid with no criminal record or involvement with law 
enforcement suddenly is connected to a senseless violent act? (PSI, pp. 7, 405.) It appears as 
though Mr. Peaslee's participation in the offense and compliance with Mr. Wray's requests is 
linked to some personality issues. In his PSI, Mr. Peaslee wrote that Mr. Wray informed him 
that Mr. Wray owed money for a drug debt and wanted to rob a gas station to get it. (PSI, p.5.) 
Mr. Peaslee complied with Mr. Wray's request and drove him to a gas station, giving Mr. Wray 
his shotgun. (PSI, p.5.) Prior to sentencing, Mr. Peaslee submitted to a psychological 
examination conducted by Dr. Camille LaCroix. (See PSI, pp.405-427.) Mr. Peaslee was 
11 
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diagnosed with A voidant Personality Disorder and Dependent Personality Disorder. (PSI, 
p.415.) Mr. Peaslee meet the requirements for Avoidant Personality Disorder based upon his 
limited number of friends growing up and "feeling socially awkward, personally unappealing 
and inadequate in new social situations." (PSI, pp.423.) Mr. Peaslee also exhibited an "early 
adulthood ... pattern of needed to be taken care of that leads to submissive and clinging 
behavior and fears of separation." (PSI, p.423.) Taken together, Dr. LaCroix opined that his 
"features of an A voidant and Dependant Personality Disorder . . . likely contributed to his 
willingness to go along with his co-defendant's plan to rob the convenience store with 
Mr. Peaslee's loaded weapon." (PSI, p.424.) This diagnosis is of course consistent with 
Mr. Peaslee's belief that "[i]f I could have been stronger in my mind and stood up for myself, I 
know this all could have been avoided." (PSI, p.7.) 
That this offense has already occurred does not mean that Mr. Peaslee should spend 
possibly the rest of his life, and certainly the next ten years of his life, in prison. Rather, the 
likelihood of Mr. Peaslee committing future violent acts is "very low." (PSI, p.425.) 
Mr. Peaslee took the Hare Psychopathy Checklist which is designed to assess an individual's 
psychopathy and risk of future violence. (PSI, p.421.) Mr. Peaslee's score put him in the 
percentile rank of .5, which means that "95.5% of male offenders have a psychopathy score 
higher than" him. (PSI, p.421.) In conjunction with the fact that Mr. Peaslee has no substance 
abuse issues and a lack of any major mental illness symptoms, Mr. Peaslee has a very low risk of 
reoffense. Accordingly, society would be protected if this Court was to reduce his sentence to a 
more appropriate length. 
12 
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Once released from prison, Mr. Peaslee has a tremendous support system to help him to 
reintegrate into society and maintain his history of lawful behavior, as he did before the instant 
offense. Eleven friends and family wrote letters in support of Mr. Peaslee at sentencing. (PSI, 
pp.340-356.) Garry Shohet, Mr. Peaslee's Boy Scout leader since Mr. Peaslee was nine, 
described the dedication that Mr. Peaslee put forth to attain the highest scout achievement, Eagle 
Scout. (PSI, p.340.) Mr. Peaslee's mother wrote that although her son enjoyed shooting guns, 
he refused to go hunting with his friends because he did not want to hurt any of the animals. 
(PSI, p.9.) Ms. Peaslee then wrote, "I know in my heart that there is no way Brandon thought 
Taylor Wray was going to shoot anyone. It just doesn't fit who he is." (PSI, p.9.) Thus, it is 
evident that once out in society, Mr. Peaslee has the support system in place to once again 
become a productive member in the community. 
Mr. Peaslee has also expressed his sincere remorse for his actions and accepted 
responsibility for his criminal conduct. Prior to sentencing, Mr. Peaslee wrote a letter to 
Mr. Hammen, the victim: "I would like to start out by simply saying how sorry I am for what 
happened. I never expected something like this to happen . . . I just wanted to tell you that I 
truly, deeply, and sincerely am sorry for what happened." (PSI, p.6.) When asked what he 
thought about his crime, Mr. Peaslee replied, "I hate the fact that I committed them, and [wish] it 
never happened. I feel terrible and and [sic] will probley [sic] never forget what I did. I also feel 
terrible about what happened to Mr. Hamand [sic] and wish that [the] events had never taken 
place." (PSI, p.5.) Then, at sentencing, Mr. Peaslee stated: 
1145.0007 
I take responsibility for my actions. I mean, I would like a chance to tum around 
and show the court that I really have - - I have potential to really be a good person 
and show the real person I am, and I would also like an opportunity to address 
Mr. Hammen. 
13 
I would like to say that I'm very sorry for what happened. What happened 
was - - it was terrible. I mean, I never dreamed of anything - - anything like that 
happening. I mean, I know none of the words that I say will probably ... ever 
make him feel better, but I would just like to express the fact that I'm sorry in his 
case. 
(Tr., p.187, L.20-p.188, L.9.) 
Accordingly, in light of the foregoing, Mr. Peaslee asserts that the district court abused its 
discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him. Mr. Peaslee asks that this Court reduce 
his sentence to fifteen years, with five years fixed, which the more appropriate sentence 
considering all of the circumstances in his case, or as this Court deems reasonable. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Peaslee respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order denying 
his motion to suppress and remand the case for further proceedings. Alternatively, Mr. Peaslee 
requests this Court reduce his sentence to fifteen years, with five years fixed, as it deems 
appropriate. 
--t, 
DATED this _2>_ day of April, 2013. 
BRADY LAW, CHARTERED 
Eric D. Fredericksen 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the s1">day of April, 2013, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following 
manner: 
Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
Idaho Attorney General's Office 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
(Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent) 
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